Call for Action: Please support my March 15 request to the Auditor General for an audit of the B.C. Government’s administration of the cable ferry by writing to bcauditor@bcauditor.com The AG’s conclusions in his l999 audit of the fast ferries that the B.C. Government failed to provide adequate governance and risk management mirror those involving the cable ferry. This audit, which the press characterized as the most scathing rebuke of government ever, triggered immediate action as the fast ferries are believed to be somewhere in Egypt now. https://www.oag.bc.ca/a-review-of-the-fast-ferry-project-governance-and-risk-management/
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Auditor General Appeal
I am appealing to the office of the Auditor General to examine the financial records of the B.C. Ferries Commissioner and Minister of Transportation with respect to their support of B.C. Ferries keeping an unsafe, unreliable, and costly Baynes Sound Connector cable ferry in iffy service. Currently the B.C. Ombudsperson is conducting an investigation into the Commissioner’s failure to hold BCF accountable.
The following gaps between BCF decision-making involving the cable ferry experiment in service and the evidence of the cost to taxpayers call also for an Auditor General investigation:
The gap between the anticipated cost of $230,000 annually for the Baynes Sound Connector operating expenses and the $5.9 million annual cost submitted in non published reports to the Commissioner.
The gap between BCF service reports indicating in 2023 that there were zero cancellations on Route 21 and evidence that the cable ferry is responsible for the most mechanical-related cancellations and repair costs in the fleet. FOI data released from 2016 – 2019 includes thirty pages of cancellations that draw on tax dollars that are not recorded in posted annual reports to the Commissioner.
The 2023 Anderson Review, authorized by the Commissioner, lists the cable ferry’s unresolved design issues and much higher than anticipated operating costs. Each time the chaotic effect of lengthy cancellations is covered in the media, the corporation gaslights with claims that the cable ferry’s problems are being resolved and that its service record is the same as that of conventional vessels. Evidence of operating costs refute this view. See media reports last May when a cable fell off on a windless day. This service interruption created significant chaos, anguish and personal expenses for imany slanders.
Although the Commissioner directed the corporation to report service interruptions transparently and promptly to all customers, the more than one month-long significant 30% reduction in service last December has yet to be acknowledged by either BCF or the Commissioner. Staff, moreover, were ordered to remain silent during this anxious period. Evidently this reduction was due to BCF finally dealing with a sham fire suppression system.
The gap between BCF’s claims that the cable ferry is safe and provides service on a par with conventional ferries and the evidence. For example, a cable could fall off in winds higher than 39 knots and evidently is currently in service without a reliable fire suppression system that can be used when in operation. The threat of an electric vehicle catching fire remains a significant safety concern.
https://www.bcferrycommission.ca/performance-reviews/
The gap between corporate claims that the mechanical problems were merely teething issues and the ongoing secrecy involving the frequent replacement of the cables. Replacing a set of cables is estimated at $900M. The 2013 $250,000 estimate of anticipated annual operating expenses evidently did not include the regular replacement of the lead cable every three years or the numerous unanticipated full set replacements due to the cables bruising on the sea floor or other unanticipated mechanical reasons. A retired master skipper estimated a few years ago that the cables had already been replaced sixteen times. Because they are replaced in secret and at night, the corporation will not provide emergency service to Route 21. Early cable replacements were explained away as merely teething issues. The fiscal evidence will show, however, that the teething issue is a chronic condition that costs taxpayers millions.
The gap between the laws regarding FOI requests and the Commissioner and Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure’s pattern of ignoring requests. Currently there are thirty-four pending FOI requests to BCF for access to how much the cable ferry costs taxpayers. The one recently released set of data from 2016 – 2019 was heavily redacted without an explanation, as required by the FOI Act. Neither the Commissioner nor Minister Farnworth has responded to my request, mailed over thirty days ago, for either a release of this data or an explanation as to why the data can’t be released. (BCF has apparently eliminated the department that formerly handled FOI requests.)
The gap between how tax money provided to support the corporation’s legal directive to engage meaningfully with ferry dependent communities and evidence that this money supports a less expensive autocratic decision-making model. The report of the Denman/Hornby Ferry Advisory Committee chair on the recent “engagement” event provides supporting evidence that the corporation has failed to move beyond the gathering feedback and reporting stage of the engagement process to include community feedback in decision-making. (See on the Commissioner’s website re the failing grade the Ferry Advisory Committees gave BCF and the Commissioner’s prompt directive to BCF to improve community engagement by engaging more meaningfully with the FACs.
Instead of following her directive, BCF axed the committees without any preliminary discussion by claiming their new digital engagement model would be more inclusive.The Commissioner has not responded to requests for an explanation re BCF’s violation of her directive. Attached is the Denman/Hornby FAC chair’s report on the recent “engagement” events that provide evidence that the corporation is continuing to “engage” autocratically and not a more costly democratic model.
The gap between fiscal responsibility and irrational decision-making regarding BCF’s resolve to keep the cable ferry in service. To date the corporation appears to be considering stretching the cable ferry rather than replacing it. BCF justifies this irrational costly decision on the fact that some money for stretching is included in the current budget. Given the increases in operating costs since 2020, the cost of stretching will be significantly more than anticipated. In addition, since stretching involves installing a heavier engine and heavier cables, its current slow motion speed will be reduced even more and will necessitate using more fossil fuel.
Denman and Hornby residents who have been stuck with unreliable ferry service for a decade look forward to your response to this appeal for an investigation into the BCF Commissioner and the Transportation Minister’s administrative practices with respect to the Baynes Sound cable ferry.
Respectfully,
Sharon Small,
On behalf of Denman and Hornby residents.
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March 29, 2025
Dear Honourable Transportation Minister Farnworth:
This follows up your February 26, 2025 response to my multiple requests for government action involving the unreliable Baynes Sound Connector. Your response that you can only forward my appeals to CEO Jimenez confirms a continuing breakdown of governance that is strikingly similar to the conclusions drawn by the BC Auditor General in his 1999 A Review of the Fast Ferries: Governance and Risk Management.
The following similarities between BCF and government actions involving the fast ferries and the Baynes Sound Connector confirm a need for stronger governance:
Failure to thoroughly research feasibility: in 2013 BCF and the provincial government rushed to pursue building a cable ferry based on the expectation of saving tax dollars. Strong opposition from previous CEOs and government officials and from industry experts who predicted that a cable ferry could not do the job was ignored. BCF’s plans to stretch the cable ferry to accommodate increased need, indicate a continuing failure to thoroughly research feasibility.
Failure to create a risk management plan: rather than having a risk management plan in case the cable ferry experiment failed, BCF temporarily patches up unresolved mechanical issues and then gaslights both government and the public that the problems are being resolved. BCF’s intent to stretch the vessel, characterized by industry experts as preposterous, suggests BCF has not created a risk management plan for stretching.
Failure to thoroughly research operating costs: the cable ferry costs $5.9M annually to operate rather than the projected $230,000 that gained government approval for the vessel. This projected cost failed to include expenses for future capacity needs or anticipated and unanticipated cable replacements. Although BCF remains secretive about the expenses for and frequency of cable replacement, experts speculate that a set of three that are shipped from abroad costs $900,000 and that a few years ago the cables had been replaced sixteen times. Failure to anticipate increased costs for stretching and for heavier cables calls for thorough research.
Failure to release information: currently there are 34 pending FOI requests that BCF and the government have not released. The released data for 2016- 2019 is confusing and so heavily redacted that the expenses for and the number of cable replacements are redacted. Withholding information is also indicated by the absence of evidence in annual cable ferry service reports to the Commissioner that contradicts the repeated claim that the vessel provides service on a par with conventional vessels. In violation of a Commissioner directive, BCF refused to explain for over a month last December why service was reduced on Route 21 or inform islanders when full service would resume.
Failure to submit accurate records: the released FOI data for 2016 – 2019 includes thirty pages of cancellations due to mechanical breakdowns, but in reports to the Commissioner BCF under-reports cancellations and repeats claims about service that is contradicted by the evidence. Although insiders claim that the cable ferry has the highest number of mechanical breakdowns and service reductions in the fleet, BCF recorded zero cancellations for Route 21 in the 2023 Annual Service Report to the Commissioner.
Failure of governance: the Commissioner and the Minister of Transportation publicly acknowledge their acceptance of BCF’s conflicting reports and claims. Responses to nine years of evidence-based complaints from islanders, our FAC, and from industry experts have generally been silence or repeating BCF marketing slogans and claiming a lack of authority to compel BCF to replace the cable ferry. Evidently, the Commissioner has the legal authority to issue directives like dramatically improving collaboration with the Ferry Advisory Committees, but lacks enforcement authority. Further, your support of BCF’s claim that a digital system will be more inclusive is not trusted by Islanders, the eighteen sacked FAC chairs who gave BCF a failing grade for meaningful engagement right before BCF sacked them, or those who reported that the February 2025 engagement events were disorganized and a waste of time.
Given this period of grave economic uncertainty, the staggering current and future expenses for transporting and replacing sets of steel cables from abroad each year, alone, should argue for improved governance and risk management planning. Transportation Minister Farnworth, I ask again, “What can you do to improve governance so that Denman and Hornby islanders are assured safe and reliable ferry service on Route 21?”
Respectfully,
Sharon Small.
